Stumbling Colossus: the Red Army on the Eve of World War

Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 1998. xvii, 374 pages: illustrations, maps; 24 cm; bibliographical references (pages 331-354) and index. Very fine. New. Paperback. ISBN: 9780700617890

Series: Modern war studies. "Drawing on evidence never before seen in the West, including combat records of early engagements, David Glantz claims that in 1941 the Red Army was poorly trained, inadequately equipped, ineptly organized, and consequently incapable of engaging in large-scale military campaigns - and both Hitler and Stalin knew it. He provides a complete and convincing study of why the Soviets almost lost the war that summer, dispelling many of the myths about the Red Army that have persisted since the war and soundly refuting Viktor Suvorov's controversial thesis that Stalin was planning a preemptive strike against Germany." —Publisher. Contents: 1.; Red Army Forces --; 2.; Command and Control and Command Personnel --; 3.; The Soviet Soldier --; 4.; Strategic Deployment Planning and Mobilization --; 5.; Combat Readiness: Ground Combat Forces --; 6.; Combat Readiness: Combat Support and Rear Service Forces --; 7.; Air Forces --; 8.; Stavka and Strategic Reserves --; 9.; Red Army Intelligence on the Eve of War --; App. A.; Red Army Order of Battle, 22 June to 1 August 1941 --; App. B.; Red Army 1941 Defense Plans --; App. C.; An Opponent's View: German Intelligence Assessments --; App. D.; Correlation of Forces on the German-Soviet Front. World War, 1939-1945 -- Campaigns -- Eastern Front. Military campaigns. Militär Weltkrieg Krijgsmacht.